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Emergent collective group processes and capabilities have been studied through analysis of trans-
active memory, measures of group task performance, and group intelligence, among others. In their
approach to collective behaviors, these approaches transcend traditional studies of group decision
making that focus on how individual preferences combine through power relationships, social choice
by voting, negotiation and game theory. Understanding more generally how individuals contribute
to group effectiveness is important to a broad set of social challenges. Here we formalize a dynamic
theory of interpersonal communications that classifies individual acts, sequences of actions, group
behavioral patterns, and individuals engaged in group decision making. Group decision making oc-
curs through a sequence of communications that convey personal attitudes and preferences among
members of the group. The resulting formalism is relevant to psychosocial behavior analysis, rules
of order, organizational structures and personality types, as well as formalized systems such as so-
cial choice theory. More centrally, it provides a framework for quantifying and even anticipating
the structure of informal dialog, allowing specific conversations to be coded and analyzed in rela-
tion to a quantitative model of the participating individuals and the parameters that govern their
interactions.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals interact to form couples, families, teams,
organizations and societies. Understanding the shift from
individuals to groups requires recognizing how collec-
tive behaviors arise and their properties. Understanding
collective behaviors in many contexts is difficult due to
the problem of observation of the processes involved [1].
However, human groups are arguably the easiest complex
system to observe as we see them all around us in profes-
sional and personal contexts. The challenge in this case
is, at least in part, knowing what to look for and how to
interpret what is observed.
One of the exciting developments in understanding
group collectivity and effectiveness has been the identifi-
cation by Wegner [2] of the concept of transactive mem-
ory, a form of “group mind” by which individuals who
share experiences and know each other can recover mem-
ories more effectively than they can separately. Origi-
nally studied in couples, this concept has motivated wide
ranging research on how it arises and its properties, in-
cluding the use of transactive memory in professional
teams [3–15].
The recovery of memories is one of many group be-
haviors that might be identified. A wider ranging body
of research has considered a variety of group qualities
linked to team task performance [16–19]. While it makes
intuitive sense that some level of individual ability is
linked to a group’s ability to perform certain tasks, other
attributes have also been considered, including individ-
ual attributes associated to social behavior such as self-
esteem, social sensitivity, social loafing, social status, and
gender, and group processes such as goal setting, cohe-
sion, trust, conflict, and sharing of communication time
[20–50].
Another key group behavior that has been studied ex-
tensively is collective decision making. Two orthogonal
mechanisms for group decisions are (1) assignment of de-
cision making to an individual who makes decisions for
the group as a whole, and (2) shared or collective decision
making processes. The analysis of the former is through
discussions of “power” in many forms [51–62], while the
latter has been extensively studied through analysis of
voting systems (social choice theory) and negotiation.
Decisions by voting and negotiation are generally con-
sidered to arise from what each individual would decide
alone if given the decision authority (individual prefer-
ence). Social choice theory considers how voting sys-
tems aggregate individual preferences with sometimes
counterintuitive results [63–68]. Negotiation, often de-
fined as combining two or more divergent preferences
into a joint agreement that must be unanimously ac-
cepted, originates in conflict in a zero-sum context [69–
71]. It is often considered similar to or even an example of
game theory [72–74] in which the decisions autonomously
adopted by each individual have consequences for others
and therefore decisions by individuals are linked. Ac-
tions involve exchanging information about preferences,
making promises or threats. Negotiation may, however,
also include integrative (mutual benefit) considerations
due to non-conflicted positive sum aspects of agreement
or benefits of long term relationships [69–71].
Another dimension of decision making in groups con-
siders how one individual can influence another poten-
tially resulting in fads and panics, and describing how
common behavior and cultures arise [75–79]. At the in-
dividual level, decision theory considers how individuals
actually do or better should make decisions given indi-
2vidual values and uncertainty [80–85].
In this paper we are interested in how groups engage
in decision making so as to benefit from combining indi-
vidual capabilities beyond just their preference. For ex-
ample, a group of individuals in a late afternoon meeting
might decide to go out for dinner and where to go. While
one person may have some of the information about what
is a good decision, another may have additional infor-
mation that modifies that decision. The best restau-
rant identified by one, might be closed due to renova-
tion known to another. One knowledgeable individual
may be reluctant to express their thoughts unless they
are encouraged by another. The focus of this paper is
on characterizing the sequence of communication among
individuals that give rise to collective decision making in
groups. Similar to transactive memory and group task
performance as well as voting and negotiation we are not
focused on the role of power itself, as in “Who makes the
decision,” [86, 87] but on the way multiple individuals
contribute to decision making. Recent discussions about
debate in international relations point to several impor-
tant distinctions in how people engage in collective deci-
sion making that are relevant [88]. In the first approach,
rational actors with fixed preferences choose actions to
optimize their utility in a social context, an essentially
game theoretic approach. In the second, social interac-
tions follow a set of rules and procedures embodying an
assumption that mutual goals exist and are at least in
part embodied by those social rules. Finally, actors also
engage in meta communication about what assumptions
are correct and what rules of social discourse apply in
specific contexts. The latter opens the door to changes
in individual opinions that affect the collective outcomes.
Thus, collective decision making is not in general spec-
ified by rigid voting frameworks, and need not be either
zero sum or reflect fixed and rigid individual priorities.
Members of a group engaged in decisions need not be
assumed to disagree. They may learn from each other.
They may have values that are not entirely selfish, and
may not even be focused on the particular decision at
hand, considering other issues as equally or more impor-
tant. For example, they may care more about the group
cohesion or its decision making process. In the meta-view
of their engagement in decisions, they may even consider
each other to play a constructive part in a collective pro-
cess of decision making that is shared. It is useful to
consider examples that are mutual, like where to go for
dinner, whether they may involve conflict at some point
or not. Our interest is in the way interpersonal interac-
tions give rise to collective decisions in such a context.
The dynamics of communication arise from a much more
fluid set of interactions than considered in voting. Kan-
tor’s theory of interpersonal interactions[89, 90] provides
a framework for characterizing the set of communications
that occur in such contexts. We formalize this frame-
work within a mathematical theory of social collective
behaviors. Compared to voting options in social choice
theory, Kantor’s theory considers a larger set of possible
actions that combine to form a dynamic decision mak-
ing process. However, the theory still identifies a limited
number of categories of actions, providing a way to clarify
the dynamics of the large set of communications that can
arise. The theory can be mapped onto real world decision
making including both informal group discourse, and the
more formal processes widely used, i.e. in Robert’s rules
of order [91]. The complexity of the latter reflects the
need to capture important details that are not embodied
in social choice theory.
In voting the available actions in a preset voting sys-
tem are votes choosing among a predetermined set of
options based on preferences, or abstention. This does
not include the action by which the set of options are
determined, an essential part of the process of decision
making. Thus it is natural to include four possible op-
tions: move (propose a new action), follow (vote in the
affirmative), oppose (vote in the negative), and by-stand
(abstain). (We note that as in social choice theory se-
quential comparison of collective preferences may give
rise to cyclical behaviors that do not converge to deci-
sions. In expanding the set of options we make no a-
priori judgement about whether the dynamics of the sys-
tem is functional.) Kantor’s theory posits that these four
actions constitute the essential categories of communica-
tions in a group. In addition to distinguishing these four
actions, there are different domains in which such actions
can take place that are directly or indirectly relevant to
the action taken. Kantor’s theory presents three: power,
meaning and affect. Others may be added in the funda-
mental description of the theory. Each domain can have
each of the four possible actions.
The basis of our contribution is to show that Kantor’s
theory is a universal characterization of the interactions
within small groups of complex entities engaged in col-
lective behavior with wide applicability to biological and
social systems at all levels of organization. It is useful
because it categorizes the many possible communications
by individuals in a group to a small set that can be used
to abstract communication patterns. The model is well
suited to identifying when collective behaviors are func-
tional or dysfunctional, for individuals or for collectives,
in a context of environmental demands, individual and
group needs.
More technically, the universal process of decision mak-
ing we describe is subject to the assumptions that (1)
there is a high dimensional space of possible decisions,
and (2) there are sequential communications of individu-
als to the entire group. The relevance of communication
by each individual to the entire group is given by the
connection between high dimensional potential decisions
requiring a lot of information and the relevance of the en-
tire group to the ultimate decision. This model is comple-
mentary to other models of decision making in which (a)
all individuals make a synchronous contribution to the
decision making as is described in the case of many vot-
ing systems, but also in the case of collective dynamics
that is found in neural networks where the input (sen-
3sory information) is a high dimensional state and output
(decision or action) is either low dimensional (as in pat-
tern recognition in feedforward networks, which combines
sequential and parallel communications) or high dimen-
sional (as in memory retrieval in attractor networks) [1],
and/or (b) there is a binary or few options of action. The
latter is also consistent with a determination of a reduced
dimensional set of options that is extrinsic to the process
of decision making (this case is in part modeled by vot-
ing theory in which voting options are pre-specified). We
will see that cases that are previously discussed in social
choice theory arise as special cases of the asynchronous
sequential dynamic decision making that we discuss here.
Because of its sequentiality and high dimensional decision
making the process we will describe is more relevant to
small group decision making and so we consider it a uni-
versal process of small group decision making. A large
group decision making process may be linked to small
group decision making through the relevance of asyn-
chronous communication to the small group that leads
to a decision that is subsequently adopted by decision of
a larger group through a synchronous decision making
process (e.g. a vote). Or a hierarchical embedding of
small within large or large within small group decisions
can lead to hybrid processes. Thus a small number of
large groups can interact sequentially overall and syn-
chronously within, or a large collection of small groups
can interact sequentially within and synchronously over-
all. Examples can be found in the real world.
II. DYNAMIC INDIVIDUALS AND
COMMUNICATIONS
Individuals and groups have complex behaviors whose
complete description would require high dimensional
time histories. However, remarkably, if we restrict our at-
tention to characterizing the relationships among actions
of individuals, we can project the description to a few di-
mensions. The relationships among actions of individuals
are precisely the dimensions that are the building blocks
of the collective behaviors of the group. This reduced set
of dimensions, as well as how individuals determine their
actions within these dimensions, and the relationship of
these actions to group behavior, is the core of the theory
by Kantor.
An individual can be quite generally characterized in
an abstract fashion as a dynamical vector of attributes,
ψi(t), where the index i indicates which individual. It is
helpful to distinguish between slowly varying aspects, i.e.
aspects that do not change much on a selected time scale
of interpersonal interactions, e.g. one hour, and those
which typically do change on that time scale or faster.
Each of these rapidly changing attributes is modified in
response to external stimuli that include the environmen-
tal conditions, and the internal dynamics of the individ-
ual. The internal dynamics include the consumption of
energy as well as the mutual influences of neurons giving
rise to the physiological basis of thought. The environ-
mental conditions include the sensory impressions that
arise from attributes of other individuals.
III. COLLECTIVE MOVEMENT: DECISION
AND FOLLOW-THROUGH
We consider the role of interpersonal interactions to
determine a direction of change of individuals relative to
each other, and in particular to determine the pattern of
collective action. Thus the nature of interactions is that
they can point to, and the individuals can subsequently
perform, movements that are coordinated. This enables
individuals to act together as a group.
To illustrate the process of collective interactions we
consider a group of individuals in a late afternoon meet-
ing discussing where to go for dinner. Given a set of
possible options about places to eat, these individuals
perform a set of interactions that result in them going
together to a certain place for dinner, or the interactions
may alternatively result in individuals going to different
places for dinner. Either way, the framework of under-
standing the role of these interactions is to be considered
in relation to the determination of where to go for din-
ner. The movement to dinner can be represented as a
displacement of the attribute coordinates of the group of
individuals, {ψi(t)}, which include as one attribute the
spatial position of an individual. A displacement of all
individuals from one original location to one final loca-
tion constitutes a collective coherent motion which is one
common pattern of collective behavior.
Generalizing this specific example, we can consider
how individual actions aggregate to form collective ac-
tions. Quite generally, we argue that collective behav-
iors are formed when a set of individuals perform a set
of interactions over a certain period of time. These in-
teractions then determine a set of actions that result in
attribute displacements that occur over a subsequent pe-
riod of time. The dynamics can be considered as mathe-
matically corresponding to the method of motion of cer-
tain bacteria through a liquid medium [92]. These bac-
teria perform a tumbling motion, followed by a straight
line motion. This movement pattern can achieve rapid
displacement while having the ability to direct the move-
ment toward improved conditions such as presence of nu-
trients or absence of toxins. Since available information is
local, the ultimate objective of movements is not known
at the beginning of a set of movements, and episodic re-
assessment of the direction of motion is necessary. How-
ever, a continuous reassessment of direction of motion
would limit progress much more severely. Thus a balance
between frequency of assessment of direction, and period
of motion is necessary to optimize the rate of progress,
given properties of the environment such as the steepness
of gradients of nutrients. Similar considerations apply to
the decision making of groups of individuals and subse-
quent collective behaviors.
4There are distinct attributes of the actions of individ-
uals during the time of decision making and during the
time of follow through activity. During the decision mak-
ing period, individuals located together in a single space
typically perform actions in sequence, one person at a
time. This is due to the exclusivity of collective chan-
nels of communication in a single space (as well as the
internal requirements of the sequential response dynam-
ics described in the theory). During the follow through
activity, generally individuals perform actions in paral-
lel, unless the pattern of activity agreed upon specifically
precludes it. Thus, during the decision about where to
go for dinner, each person speaks in turn. During the
period of walking to dinner, all are walking in parallel.
The reason for the difference can be understood from the
process of achieving consensus during the initial period,
followed by the possibility of independent actions that
are coherent in the second period.
The requirements of the process of alternation of de-
cision with action also implies a need to ensure that de-
cision processes achieve closure through a time bounded
process. This is essential even in the absence of perfect
decision making or complete information.
The example of people choosing to go to dinner is sim-
ilar to the bacteria moving through a liquid medium in
that both refer to spatial displacement. This should not
be taken as a limitation. The same concepts can be ap-
plied quite generally to displacements in the very general
attribute space having to do with the wide ranging set of
possible activities engaged in by groups.
IV. DISCRETE COMMUNICATION
DYNAMICS
The attributes of multiple individuals over time affect
each other during the period of decision making in a
group. Actions by one individual that impact another in-
dividual are generally considered to be communications.
While we can formulate the theory directly in terms of
the general individual attributes, ψi(t), it is helpful to
start by simplifying the discussion by mapping these at-
tributes onto communications, discrete units of activity
that have shared meaning among individuals, given by
an attribute vector ξi(t) = M(ψi(t)). The purpose of
this mapping is to enable us to consider two statements
or gestures that may appear quite different, but share a
common meaning, as having a similar description. Thus,
if one person says “Let’s eat at Sally’s diner” and “Let’s
go to the same place we had dinner at last night” map
onto a similar meaning if Sally’s was the place that din-
ner was eaten the previous night, even though the actual
words spoken are different. Even if the words spoken are
the same, their tonality, tempo and accent, varies among
individuals, and for different instances by one individual.
Similarly, it is possible that two statements have similar
words but entirely different meanings, whether because
of intonation (sarcasm) or that a single key word in the
statement is different, i.e. insertion of the word “not.”
Unlike ψi(t), for ξi(t) we can assume similarity in the
attribute vector implies similarity of meaning in the do-
main of individual and group behavior. While specifics of
the meaning map are interesting, and may play a role in
our discussion, we bypass these details because it is tan-
gential to the current purpose. Thus, for example, the
issues that arise when meaning maps are not coincident
among individuals are important but can be considered
as an additional overlay to the theory we will develop.
In particular we are interested in how one communica-
tion is related to previous communications:
ξi(t) = H [{ξj(t
′)}] (1)
where ξi(t) is the communication of individual i, and
{ξj(t
′)} are the set of communications by individuals at
prior times, and H is a function that specifies how the
current behavior is related to previous communications.
Such generalized models of dynamical behaviors have
been used to describe the changing firing patterns of
neurons in the brain, the development of color patterns
on animal skins, the dynamics of panic in an audito-
rium, and other specific measures of individual and col-
lective social attributes.[1] The main difference in the hu-
man communication model is the possibility of complex
high dimensional communications, which while present
in other cases is frequently not described as behaviors
are abstracted as represented by single bits at a specific
time.
A specific statement may respond to only one of the
previous communications. This would be written as:
ξi(t) = H(ξj(t)(t
′(t))) (2)
The choice of which statement to respond to adds to
the complexity of the communications. It is possible for
an individual to respond to the immediately preceding
statement, or to a specific statement that subsequently
collects multiple responses until a different statement be-
comes the statement that is responded to. The individual
who is speaking may choose which previous statement to
respond to as well as choose the response. Alternatively,
there may be a separate mechanism by which the state-
ment to be responded to is determined, for example by
rules of the group about “motions” [91]. This gives rise
to a first form of meta communications, identifying what
is the topic of conversation. More generally, statements
may be a response to a collection of previous statements.
For a first order analysis we consider only the case where
an individual chooses a response to a specific previous
statement, without rules for its determination.
V. ACTION CATEGORIES: MOVE, FOLLOW,
OPPOSE, BYSTAND
A key characteristic of a communication about a poten-
tial future action of the group (in brief, a conversational
5“action”) is its relationship to previous communications
by others. We distinguish four categories of action rela-
tionships. A communicated action that is orthogonal to
a previous action is labeled a “Move”, a parallel action
is a “Follow” an anti-parallel action is an “Oppose” and
a non-action is a “Bystand”. This is an exhaustive set
of possible of high dimensional changes in a simple ty-
pology that is concerned with the process of individuals
determining whether to move together and the direction
to move in. In greater detail:
• A significant action that is not related in a specific
way to previous actions is an initiation of a direc-
tion of possible future movement of the group. This
is labeled a “Move”. We can visualize it as a step
of an individual in a direction of a particular place
to eat, or the verbal analog of such a step, “Let’s
eat at Sally’s diner”.
Mathematically this corresponds to a vector that
is orthogonal to previous moves, i.e. is in a new
direction:
ξi(t) · ξj(t
′) = 0
|ξi(t)| > 0
(3)
The first equation specifies that there is no projec-
tion of the action on the directions of previous ac-
tion by others. The second equation specifies that
the action has significant magnitude.
• A significant action that is in the same direction as
a previous action is labelled a “Follow”. It corre-
sponds to a step consistent with participating in a
coherent collective action.
Mathematically this corresponds to a vector that is
parallel to the previous move responded to:
ξi(t) · ξj(t
′) > 0
|ξi(t)| > 0
(4)
• A significant action that is in the opposite direction
of a previous action is labelled an “Oppose”. It cor-
responds to a step inconsistent with participating
in a collective action in the original direction.
Mathematically this corresponds to a vector that is
anti-parallel to the previous move responded to:
ξi(t) · ξj(t
′) < 0
|ξi(t)| > 0
(5)
• Finally, a nonsignificant action corresponding to
staying in place, is labeled a “Bystand”.
Mathematically this corresponds to a vector of zero
(small) magnitude:
|ξi(t)| ≈ 0 (6)
We might further characterize the magnitudes of spe-
cific action overlaps, and a single action may have
nonzero projections along multiple prior directions of ac-
tion. These can be considered as additions to the basic
typology given above. In the basic typology we are con-
cerned with the “sign” of the response by one individual
to another, where sign in this case is a three valued func-
tion, taking the values ±1 as well as zero.
VI. SYNCHRONOUS OR ASYNCHRONOUS
COMMUNICATIONS
Communication among individuals who are part of a
group are to varying degrees parallel/synchronous or se-
rial/asynchronous. Where a communication medium is
exclusive at a particular time, the communications are
properly modeled as serial. Where they are not exclu-
sive they may be in parallel. Typically spoken auditory
communication is considered to be exclusive, though it
is possible for multiple individuals to speak at once—the
difficulty with multiple parallel communications arises in
the limitations on cognitive processing of the individ-
ual that receives multiple communications. Therefore,
social norms more or less strictly limit spoken commu-
nications to be serial. Applause is another channel of
auditory communication, which is considered inherently
synchronous. Visual communication, i.e. facial expres-
sion or posture, might be considered to be synchronous
because each individual has a posture or expression at all
times, and one person can see multiple individual in their
field of view. Still, expressions are often held for a pe-
riod of time and changed at discrete times, whereby the
changes of expression attract attention, and an individ-
ual generally only pays attention to one other individual
at any particular time. Thus we see that these modali-
ties are only approximately serial or parallel, but might
be treated in one or the other way to first approximation.
The differences in serial and parallel communication
channels are also relevant to the types of communication
that occur. Moves are generally limited to be serial. Each
Move, being a high dimensional communication distinct
from prior actions, must be communicated and separately
processed by the individuals who receive it. Moreover,
the responses to one Move must be separated from the
responses to other actions, in order to be meaningfully re-
lated to group behavior. On the other hand, Follows and
Opposes can be highly parallel, as the amount of infor-
mation communicated may be as simple as the fact of the
follow or oppose, which can be communicated in a single
bit of information. I.e., considering Follows and Opposes
together, the minimal communication in response to a
Move is a binary response which is a vote of Follow or
Oppose. Along with a Bystand, we have a single “active”
bit and a “null” or abstain passive response. While this
is the minimum amount of information in a response to
a Move, this does not imply that every Follow or Oppose
is restricted to this amount of information. Where such
6a reduced information is applicable, the aggregation of
information can be done through a tally (a vote) consid-
ered as a representation of the group preference. From
this we see that the conventional abstraction of group in-
teractions into proposal and voting, is a simplified limit
of the more complete group communication action model
of Kantor. We also note that the result of a tally is itself
a statement that is distinct from other statement types
and can be responded to by individuals of the group.
Typical small group Follow or Oppose, and even By-
stand, communications have larger amounts of informa-
tion than a single vote. Thus, the limitation of attention
and processing by each individual restricts the number of
parallel communications that can be effectively transmit-
ted between individuals, especially when they are com-
municated among an entire group. Thus, it is reasonable
to consider a serial model of communication and we will
focus on such a model here. (We note that a fully parallel
model could also be constructed. In such a model, each
individual at each time would respond to the other indi-
vidual’s actions at a previous time, or multiple previous
times. Such a model of response of each individual to the
set of prior actions of the whole group, would be similar
to a dynamic models of a recursive neural network, or
recursive dynamic model of pattern forming of pigment
cells.[1] However, as mentioned previously, in such mod-
els each communication by a cell is generally represented
as a single bit and this simplifies the structure of the
model in a different way.)
Asynchronous models have a key additional feature
that must be considered—the order of response. In
many abstract models of asynchronous communication,
the next responder is chosen at random. However, in
a social group context, individuals may have reasons or
character traits that result in actions in a certain or-
der. Some individuals may and generally do act more
frequently than others. Identifying the dynamics of se-
quence must be considered part of the description of the
group dynamics.
Thus, in an asynchronous model, parameters are
needed to describe the degree to which an individual
chooses to act, or not to act, i.e. their tendency to-
ward inhibition. In the simplest model we will assume
that there is a single parameter describing this tendency.
Note that because a less reticent person will communi-
cate before a more reticent person, and it is necessary
at minimum to have two people to have a conversation,
conversations may tend to be dominated by a few indi-
viduals, no matter how many people are present.
Moreover, since individuals are not required to act in
most groups, it is generally not possible to know what is
the response of an individual unless he or she chooses to
voice it. This creates an additional dynamic of withheld
or hidden information that is integral to group behav-
ior and its very nature makes it difficult to characterize.
While there are other mechanisms that obscure commu-
nications, including their degree of truthfulness, we see
that the existence of hidden information is part of group
communications even in the presence of truthfulness.
Indeed, the sequentiality and non-determinism of or-
der give rise to a need for meta-communications about
human group interactions. These meta-communications
are directed at revealing hidden information, which may
be key to group decision making, especially where ex-
posing the participation or non participation of individ-
uals in group behaviors under consideration is relevant
to the ultimate outcome, and thus the consequences for
the group. Sequentiality and meta-communications also
give rise to the formal and informal structuring of con-
versations by “rules of order.” This second topic of rules,
where the structure of communications are formalized,
are typically designed so that more individuals partici-
pate and the conversation is compelled to achieve clo-
sure. Methods, include polling of individuals, and social
conventions about required participation in collective be-
haviors for certain poll results. Without such structures,
it may be impossible to determine what the collective de-
cision is, as only some of the individuals may choose to
participate in the communications, and typically only a
few will. Rules of order, structure the time for decision
making, and compel the group to remain together despite
dissent.
We see that social choice theory and the rules of or-
der, can be considered founded on a more fundamental
concept of group social interactions, which in a certain
limit simplifies to those theories of group behavior. This
suggests the underlying conceptual basis that we are de-
veloping can address important issues in group behavior.
VII. ASSOCIATION DYNAMICS
The dynamics of group decision making is also inher-
ently linked to the dynamics of group association, which
characterizes the inclusion or exclusion of individuals,
and the association or dissociation of the group as a
whole. Among the relevant questions for our consider-
ation are the coupling of group decision making to the
group association, and the coupling of the behavior of
individuals during group decision making to their indi-
vidual choice to participate, or group choice to include
or exclude them. Simply put, whether an individual’s
preferences are aligned with group decisions affects both
the group’s and the individual’s desire to be part of the
group. For couples, this dynamics include whether to
marry or divorce. For business this includes incorpora-
tion and disbanding of associations. Group association
dynamics can be refined to include strength of association
or level of group engagement.
A “zeroth” model of group association would have any
decision be itself a decision to associate or dissociate.
Each individual would act according to his/her own state-
ments, resulting in the final mover and followers going
together, the opposers going in different directions, and
bystanders staying in place. A first model of group as-
sociation would have a single parameter characterizing
7group adhesiveness or “surface tension,” that tends to
keep the group together. The strength of this force de-
termines the degree to which opposers participate in the
eventual group activity. Even a small amount of (posi-
tive) cohesiveness would imply bystanders participate.
Group decision making may also directly engage in de-
termining group composition. This is the third type of
meta communication we have identified. In the discus-
sion below, we will see that specific personalities may
dominate this domain of discourse due to preferential re-
actions to different individuals.
VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
The purpose of organizational structures is to habitu-
ate roles of individuals in social communications.
Quite generally, groups organized around functions
have mechanisms for achieving collective actions. These
mechanisms include the dynamics of social interaction.
In order to streamline the process of decision making
so that the resources it consumes are reduced, the or-
ganization structure can formalize roles of individuals.
The “leader” engages in Moves, and others are follow-
ers engaging in Follows. Bystanders may exist to fulfill
particular functions when needed. Consistent with the
dynamics of progressive refinement of group association,
individuals who tend to Oppose do not continue to be
part of a group.
We will discuss later the functional benefits to the
group of the dynamics of different roles under different
circumstances. This will include the potential construc-
tive role of opposers. Still, organizations that strive to
include opposers, would tend to limit their roles in scope
and effect.
IX. DYNAMIC MODEL
Amathematical model of group decision dynamics con-
structs the type of actions that are taken in terms of types
of actions that have been taken in the past. In the sim-
plest form, this would depend only on the most recent
move (i.e. a deterministic iterative map or a stochas-
tic Markov chain). More generally, we can consider a
dynamic model that depends on a certain number of pre-
vious messages, the messages within a time interval, the
most recent message of each of the individuals in the
team, the most recent message of a particular type, etc.
As a first approximation, it is conventional to consider
a linear approximation of the dependency. We illustrate
this for the case of a single communication depending on
a single prior communication:
ξi(t) = hi(t) + Ji,jξj(t− 1) (7)
where hi(t) can be considered to be the intrinsic inclina-
tion of individual i, and Ji,j is the (to first order fixed)
linear response of individual i to the comments of individ-
ual j. It is helpful to distinguish between three different
cases for Ji,j . Ji,j > 0 implies that i tends to follow per-
son j, Ji,j < 0 implies that i tends to oppose person j,
and Ji,j ≈ 0 implies i tends to ignore person j.
Testing the projection of the current on the previous
state identifies the type of communication at time t in
terms of the communication at time t− 1.
ξi(t) · ξj(t− 1) = hi(t) · ξj(t− 1) + Ji,jξj(t− 1)ξj(t− 1)
= hi(t) · ξj(t− 1) + Ji,j |ξj(t− 1)|
2
(8)
Considering only the sign ±, 0, i.e. the type of commu-
nication:
sign(ξi(t) · ξj(t− 1)) = sign(hi(t) · ξj(t− 1)) + Ji,j |ξj(t− 1)|
2)
(9)
There are two different cases to consider:
The first case is if the comment by individual j hap-
pens to have a projection, either positive or negative,
along the direction of the intrinsic preference of individ-
ual i. In this case, we have a competition between the
two terms. If the projection is positive and i is inclined
to follow j the response will be a Follow. If the projec-
tion is negative, and i is inclined to oppose j the response
will be an Oppose. If the projection is positive, and i is
inclined to oppose, or if the projection is negative, and i
is inclined to follow, the result will be determined by a
balance between the amplitudes of each effect.
The second case is if the comment by individual j does
not have a significant projection along the direction of
the intrinsic desire of individual i. We note that because
of the high dimensional nature of the possible commu-
nications, this can be expected to be the default case,
i.e. a random choice of communication by individual j
would not have a projection along the intrinsic desires
of individual i. (The magnitude of an inner product of
two random vectors is the result of a random walk with
a number of steps given by the number of vector compo-
nents. The magnitude is proportional to the square root
of the number of steps, which, for large number of com-
ponents is small compared to inner products that scale as
the number of components. [1]) Only when the space of
possible comments is for some reason limited, is it likely
that the first case, where there is an intrinsic preference
by the individual, applies. A simplest model would there-
fore set the first term to zero, eliminating the role of the
intrinsic preference of the individual. In this case, we
have the result that:
sign(ξi(t) · ξj(t− 1)) = sign(Ji,j)(1 − δ(ξj(t− 1), 0))
(10)
Neither factor depends on the specific content of the mes-
sage. This equation has the immediate interpretation
that to first (linear) order the projection onto the previ-
ous message, i.e. the category of the move, is independent
of the message content. The response of one individual
to a comment by another is then dependent only on the
persistent relationship between the individuals. The final
8factor on the right of Eq. (9) implies that to linear order
a null communication has a null response.
The analysis thus far focuses on the responses in terms
of the prior communication that range from Follow to
Oppose. A Move arises when the projection of ξi(t) and
ξj(t−1) is small. This occurs for an individual for whom
the influence of others is small (Ji,j ≈ 0) or in a context in
which the prior communication is itself of low magnitude
|ξj(t)| ≈ 0. In this case the communication will be in the
direction of the intrinsic desire of the individual, hi(t),
with no significant projections on prior communications,
i.e. a Move.
Finally, a Bystand occurs when an individual neither
has a strong preference hi(t), nor a strong interaction
Ji,j , or in case the two are balanced against each other.
The case where both are small may also arise because
of an inhibited response, which could be represented by
an overall multiplicative factor that suppresses response.
The inability, to first order, to observe the difference be-
tween inhibited responses and lack of preference is con-
sistent with the actual challenge of understanding human
response. The dynamics of sequentiality of acts must be
considered carefully. People act or wait for a turn to act
in the context of group interactions. Absence of a state-
ment, maybe a wait state or may, under some conditions,
constitute a Bystand — i.e. does the person have an in-
tended action and is waiting for their turn to speak, or
are they choosing not to act.
The model we have developed focuses our attention
on the role of the intrinsic preference of the individual
and the role of the intrinsic tendency of one individual in
response to each of the other individuals independent of
the content of the messages.
X. POWER, MEANING, AFFECT
When participants in a conversation make statements,
their statements may be directed at moving the group to
collective action directly, or may address aspects of cog-
nitive, relational or other aspects of the system including
meta-conversations about the subject, process of the di-
alog, or group dynamics. In general, a high dimensional
attribute vector will have subdomains of attributes ac-
cording to the modularity of the system. The nature of
the modularity will vary among different kinds of sys-
tems. Here, some degree of non-universality enters into
the discussion for application to different systems, though
we expect that universality will still be significant. State-
ments can be categorized by what domain they are refer-
ring to. A different way to categorize the statements is
by fundamental contributors of human response. For hu-
man social interactions, we identify three sub-domains of
individual actions and their collective analogs. They are
physical action oriented, cognitive meaning oriented, and
affect oriented. From the point of view of the underlying
vector of individual attributes, we can adopt conceptual
or physiological languages to describe these different do-
mains.
Conceptually, the action oriented domain is associated
to group behavior that manifests in physical activity, that
of cognitive meaning is associated to changes in the inter-
pretation of external stimuli or human communication,
that of affect is associated with how individuals in the
group feel about each other. We note that affect can be
involved in how someone feels about a particular course
of action, but the distinguishing characteristic of affect
is its role in group relationships: “I feel we should go
together to Sally’s diner” is an affect statement, while “I
feel we should go to Sally’s diner” may not be. In terms
of neurophysiological function, the action domain charac-
terizes motor activity of motor neurons and muscles, the
meaning domain characterizes cognitive processing, the
affect domain characterizes the coupling of neural and
endocrine systems.
These three domains are identified by Kantor with the
terms Power, Meaning and Affect. The use of the term
“Power” is suggested by the direct relevance of state-
ments in this domain to action and when simply articu-
lated are directives to action, though actual power over
decisions may be shared due to statements made by oth-
ers. The term “Meaning” is suggested by the role of cog-
nition in evaluating options for action. The term “Affect”
is linked to the distinct importance of emotional aspects
of interactions to decision making by the group.
Since communications among individuals are input
through sensory channels, each of these domains is a
characterization of part of the neural processing asso-
ciated with response to environmental input, and may
have associated output in the form of verbal or other
communications. They are distinct in that, physical ac-
tion is ultimately realized by non-verbal physical behav-
ior, meaning is generally communicated verbally, affect
is manifest through impacts on patterns of response and
behavior.
We will see from later analysis of the underlying math-
ematics of these interactions that the roles of these state-
ments have implications for (a) directing action, (b) di-
recting preferences about actions, (c) directing prefer-
ences about relationships among individuals. These es-
sential distinctions suggest a degree of universality for
these categories.
Each of the domains interacts with the other domains.
For example, cognitive processing impacts on both ac-
tions of the motor system and the emotions associated
to the endocrine system. The emotional state impacts
on cognitive interpretation and actions. Actions taken
impact emotional states and cognitive processing both
through their external manifestations (including commu-
nications) and internal consequences.
There are other aspects of discourse that may also be
separated. One is that of values. Value statements po-
tentially include a role in changing the group priorities
that can affect all aspects of discourse including actions,
preferences about actions, and preferences about rela-
tionships among individuals. In this paper we focus on
9Power, Meaning and Affect.
Mathematically, it is possible to write the vector
of attributes of an individual, or the vector of at-
tributes of the meaning of communications, as approx-
imately partitioned into the three sub-domains, ψi(t) =
{ψpi (t), ψ
c
i (t), ψ
e
i (t)} and ξi(t) = {ξ
p
i (t), ξ
c
i (t), ξ
e
i (t)}.
Specific models characterizing the ways each of these
domains impacts on the other in terms of relevant math-
ematical equations can be constructed.
For this paper it is more central to note that while
it is intuitive to consider collective behaviors as charac-
teristic of physical action, it is possible for the group to
collectively perform actions that are primarily cognitive
or affective. Correspondingly, the types of acts described
earlier: Move, Follow, Oppose, and Bystand, can occur
separately in each of these domains. Thus it is possible
to perform a Move in the emotional or meaning domain
as well as in the physical action domain. The partition
of the domains is useful for the analysis of patterns of
social interaction. In particular, it enables classifying a
wide range of communications whose roles would not be
apparent if the only types of collective action considered
would be that of physical action.
The interplay of Power, Meaning and Affect leads to
a difficulty in disentangling them. By focusing on their
primary roles, we can build a model that can be subse-
quently generalized to address other secondary roles that
may be the most important under certain circumstances
or for certain individuals. A first model of the dynamical
roles of Power, Meaning and Affect is as follows:
Power characterizes behavior that has consequences
measured directly in terms of goals of the system—
typically in this society these include health, fame and
fortune, among others, and may vary in other contexts.
An example is “Let’s eat at Sally’s diner,” which can be
understood as aimed at achieving a goal oriented activity
for the group aimed at health, assuming that it is dinner
time and people are hungry, and the food at Sally’s diner
is good.
Meaning actions are designed to impact on the mem-
bers of the group and only indirectly on actions to achieve
the goals of the group. In particular, they change the in-
trinsic desires of members of the group, hi. An example
of a Move in meaning space is “I saw a cockroach at
Sally’s diner.” The purpose of such a communication is
two fold. First, so that the intrinsic preferences of in-
dividuals are modified so that subsequent actions quite
generally and not just a specific one under discussion, are
more likely to achieve goals (i.e. health). Second, so that
the intrinsic preferences of the individuals of the group
are more aligned with each other. Since a Move generally
is in the direction of the intrinsic desire of an individual,
this changes the analysis of the model in that hi(t) is
partly aligned with hj(t). The result of such a Move is
that future communications by one individual are more
likely to be aligned with those of other individuals, lead-
ing to increased probability of collective behavior.
Affect actions are designed to impact on the interper-
sonal relations within the group, and similar to meaning
actions, they only indirectly impact on actions to achieve
the goals of the group. In particular, they change the in-
teraction matrix Ji,j . The central aspect of affect in this
model is whether an individual wants to do something
with another individual. The role of affect can be better
understood when it is recognized that there are multi-
ple satisfying patterns of social interaction that involve
consistency among the actions taken. In particular, two
individuals who both desire to be together, or both desire
not to be together, can both be satisfied. On the other
hand, two individuals are in a mutually incompatible sit-
uation if the first desires to be with the second, while the
second does not desire to be with the first. Thus, desires
of individuals can result in functional or dysfunctional
states, depending on whether they are mutually consis-
tent. Since the differences between these states are not
inherently contained in objective conditions, they cannot
be resolved by cognitive analysis. Affect enables individ-
ual actions to be selected based upon the self-consistency
of relationships. Acts in affect promote a self-consistent
pattern of mutual support or mutual antagonism, by ad-
justing the sign of Ji,j to be equal to the sign of Jj,i.
An example of a Move in affect space is “I enjoy having
dinner with you.” The purpose is to communicate the
positive sign of Ji,j in order to prompt the second indi-
vidual to recognize that mutuality is possible by a change
in affect and therefore cause such a change in affect, i.e.
a more positive Jj,i. Affect actions directly target mutu-
ality and are inherently related to collectivity of a group,
i.e. its tendency to act together or separately. Given that
the high complexity of possible actions implies that most
if not all Moves will be orthogonal to the intrinsic desires
of others, as discussed before, the role of affect is critical
in collective action.
In summary: Power actions are for achieving goals.
Meaning is for aligning preferences with external / in-
trinsic consequences. Affect is for aligning desires of mu-
tuality. We see that individual and collective movements
can occur in these three domains, and can be analyzed
in the same language. However, because each of these
plays a different role in the individual, the significance of
these individual and collective movements for the group
are distinct.
XI. MODEL PARAMETERS AND THEIR
DYNAMICS
We consider individual inclinations hi(t) to be time de-
pendent in the sense that an individual may get hungry
and want to go to eat dinner. Other aspects of the in-
clination of an individual may be more persistent, such
as causes a person is devoted to. Also, as previously
discussed, communications in Meaning can affect the in-
dividual inclinations.
We consider Ji,j to be time dependent. A reasonable
first model for such changes is that the presence of com-
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munications that are aligned (anti-aligned) of two indi-
viduals tends to make their Ji,j more positive (more neg-
ative) respectively. This corresponds to mathematical
models of Hebbian imprinting in neural learning where
the individuals are analogs of neurons. This form of
learning reinforces patterns of social interaction so that
certain individuals tend to become more positive or nega-
tive relative to each other, causing those who tend to act
in concert to be more likely to act in concert in the future,
and similarly those who act in opposition will be more
likely to act in opposition in the future., It also tends to
make those who have compatible preferences tend also
to have mutually reinforcing interpersonal relationships.
Also, as previously discussed, communications in Affect
can affect the individual inclinations.
XII. CLASSIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS
Different individuals tend to adopt different types of
actions, which leads to a means for classifying them.
The reason for these choices are embedded in persistent
properties of individuals rather than dynamic properties,
which are therefore to be identified as personality types.
We can identify the types of actions preferred by indi-
viduals from the categories of “Move, Follow, Oppose,
Bystand.”
In the mathematical model, an individual is identified
by the parameters hi and Ji,j for a particular value of
i. These parameters generally vary for different values of
the index, j, i.e. in relation to different people, and at
different times. We identify personalities by postulating
that for a particular individual these parameters have
characteristic values that persist over time and satisfy
identifiable patterns across people.
The identification of those who frequently perform just
one of the types of actions can be readily identified:
A person with strong preferences hi and weak interac-
tions Ji,j is goal/content driven, and frequently Moves.
A person who has strong interpersonal interactions Ji,j
and weak preferences hi will respond to other moves.
They Follow, if Ji,j tends to be positive, or they Oppose,
if Ji,j tends to be negative.
A person with weak preferences and weak interactions
tends to Bystand. As discussed previously, an additional
overall amplitude parameter can be considered as de-
scribing an inhibition of response. Thus, a persistent
bystander may have externally unexpressed preferences
and interactions.
Among other insights, we see that the those who are
frequent movers, often identified as “leaders,” have a ten-
dency toward more limited social interactions compared
to those who are followers and opposers.
Certain combinations of parameters also tend to gen-
erate more complex response patterns, specifically when
the tendency is to adopt more than one type of action ac-
cording to specifics of the circumstances. A person with
strong preferences and strong interactions has a varied
response. Such a person, in order to reduce conflicts
between preferences and interactions may also tend to
engage in Meaning acts, through whose adoption by the
group, the conflict will be reduced. A person with weak
preferences and strong interactions that vary significantly
among individuals, i.e. with strong interpersonal pref-
erences, will tend to follow some and oppose others. In
order to reduce conflicts, between following and opposing
individuals, such a person may engage in Affective acts to
reduce conflict. Alternatively, in some sense equivalently,
such an individual may act in the dynamics of selecting
group membership.
XIII. SUMMARY
The understanding of group interactions related to de-
cision making may be advanced by considering a limited
typography of communication acts. We have shown that
it is possible from general mathematical considerations
to identify four types of actions, {Move, Follow, Oppose,
Bystand}, as universal, and using simple mathematical
dynamic models to advance the understanding of group
dynamics. We have explored some of the implications
including identifying personality types and the relation-
ship between types of actions taken and the types of per-
sonalities that are present as described by the model.
The model we obtained follows closely the discussion and
analysis of conversations in families and businesses by
Kantor [89, 90]. The usefulness of this model in diagnos-
ing functional and dysfunctional behaviors and interven-
tions has already been demonstrated.
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